Technical Program

Paper Detail

Paper: PS-1B.16
Session: Poster Session 1B
Location: Symphony/Overture
Session Time: Thursday, September 6, 18:45 - 20:45
Presentation Time:Thursday, September 6, 18:45 - 20:45
Presentation: Poster
Paper Title: Non-Computational Functionalism: Computation and the Function of Consciousness
Manuscript:  Click here to view manuscript
Authors: Gualtiero Piccinini, University of Missouri - Saint Louis, United States
Abstract: The view that the mind, including phenomenal consciousness, has a functional nature (functionalism) does not entail that the mind has a wholly computational nature (computational functionalism). An unappreciated option is that the mind has a functional yet non-computational nature. This latter option, non-computational functionalism, is not a type-identity theory either, because it posits that phenomenal consciousness is constituted by higher-level properties that are not identical to lower-level physical states.